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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
WILLIAM w'. MORRIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14517 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover on a personal guaranty 
executed by the Appellant, William E. Morris, in favor of 
Packaging Corporation of America, Respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable Stewart 
M..Hanson, Sr. presiding. Plaintiff-Respondent was awarded 
judgment against the Defendant-Appellant in the sum of $20,000.00 
together with court costs of $28.00 and attorney's fees of 
32,000.00. From that adverse judgment the Defendant-Appellant 
has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
District Court affirmed in its entirety. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Packaging Corporation of America is a corporation 
which operates two plants in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 92, 1. 27-30). 
Respondent had for many years supplied packaging material for 
Bakkerfs Royal Dutch Cookies located in Draper, Utah. Bakkerfs 
Royal Dutch Cookies became financially depressed and a court 
appointed receiver took over their assets and the operation of the 
business. Hawkeye Investment, by and through one of its largest 
stockholders, William Morris, (R. 138, 1. 9 and R. 164, 1. 10-11) 
made an application to the court appointed receiver in the State of 
Utah for the purchase of the assets of Bakker's Royal Dutch Cookies 
(R. 91, 1. 19-25). Hawkeye Investment thereafter contacted 
Respondent in an attempt to establish a line of credit so it 
could continue to purchase cookie cartons for its products. The 
business was new and it was not financially able to pay for the 
products, so Respondent required that all shipments be shipped 
C.O.D. (R. 128, 1. 3). 
Appellant further informed Al Ellison, credit manager of 
Respondent, that he would be in Utah and would "oversee the 
operation and get reports from the local people on how things 
were progressing" (R. 145, 1. 23) . 
Appellant William Morris and one William Birkinshaw, the 
president of Hawkeye Investment, approached the credit manager 
of Respondent in an attempt to establish an open account with 
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Respondent (R. 167, 1. 2-8). It was agreed between the parties 
that credit would be extended to Hawkeye Investment if Mr. Morris 
and Mr. Birkinshaw would personally sign a guaranty in the sum of 
$10/000.00. This was done and the credit was then extended 
(R. 66, 1. 23-28). 
Within a short period of time it became apparent to the 
persons who were operating the cookie factory in Draper and the 
agents and employees of Respondent that a $10,000.00 guaranty was 
not sufficient (R. 95). Thereafter respondent, by and through 
James Remley, area credit manager, contacted Mr. Morris to see 
if he would be willing to execute a new personal guaranty in the 
sum of $20,000.00 (R. 99 and R. 110, 1. 3-13). After some 
discussion Appellant agreed to execute a guaranty and it was 
forwarded by Mr. Remley to the Appellant, who signed the same, 
giving it to his agent, Milt Gordon, for transportation to 
Respondents plant in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 169, 1. 15-16). 
At no time did Mr. Morris communicate to Respondent that 
there were any conditions attached to his personal guaranty, such 
as the signature of Mr. Birkinshaw being necessary (R. 169, 1. 
22-25). 
During the years 1971 (R. 132, 1. 25-30 and R. 133, 1. 1-12) 
and 1972 (R. 167, 1. 12-13) Mr. Morris would come to the State of 
Utah on business connected with Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's 
Royal Dutch Cookies on the average of twice a year. Mr. Milt 
Gordon was Mr. Morris's agent within the State of Utah and was 
looking out for Morris Morris's investment in Hawkeye Investment 
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(R. 147, 1. 23-29, R. 154, 1. 17 and R. 168, 1.14-30). In 
addition he would call Mr. Gordon in Salt Lake City at least 
once a week (R. 167, 1. 17-18, R. 169, 1. 1-10). These calls 
concerned the business with which Respondent was dealing in 
supplying the cookie packages (R. 169, 1. 1-2). This is the 
same business, to wit: Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's Royal 
Dutch Cookies, which failed to pay the amounts due and owing to 
Respondent, causing Respondent to institute this action on 
Appellant's personal guaranty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE APPELLANT HAD 
SUBMITTED HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
Immediately after plaintiff commenced this action, 
defendant made a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction. In support of this motion the 
appellant submitted the affidavit of William W. Morris (R. 11) 
and the respondent submitted the affidavits of Al Ellison (R. 12) 
and Raymond E. Casaday (R. 17). A hearing was held before the 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, on or about the 8th day of October, 1974. At that time 
the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 22). There-
after, at the time of trial, the appellant renewed their motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R. 162). The Third Judicial 
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District Court, by and through the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson 
Sr., declined to entertain the motion in light of recent decisions 
of this Honorable Court which have held to the effect that where 
one District Judge has entered an order another District Judge is 
not in a position to vacate such order. Petersen v. Petersen 
(1974) 530 P.2d 821; In Re Estate of Mecham (1975) 537 P.2d 312. 
Judge Hanson took the entire matter of the trial under 
advisement, and on the 16th day of October, 1975, rendered a 
Memorandum Decision (R. 52-53). The Judge stated: 
"Another division of this court has already 
passed upon the question of whether or not there was 
sufficient minimal contact in Utah to give the 
plaintiff jurisdiction under the long-arm statute 
and found that this court did have jurisdiction, and 
it would appear from the evidence which developed 
during the trial that there was sufficient minimal 
contact to confer jurisdiction upon this court under 
the long-arm statute." (Emphasis added) 
The Appellant, William Morris, came to the State of Utah 
as a large stockholder of Hawkeye Investment Company and acquired 
for Hawkeye Investment Company the assets of Bakker's Royal Dutch 
Cookies. This was an operating business located in Draper, Utah. 
The company then became known as Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's 
Royal Dutch Cookies. It transacted business with Respondent, 
Packaging Corporation of America, all of which business was 
transacted within the State of Utah. 
This writer would submit that Appellant has not claimed 
that any of the business was transacted any place but in the 
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State of Utah. This business was between Hawkeye and Packaging 
Corporation of America. No claim could be made that if 
Respondent was suing Hawkeye Investment, a Nevada corporation, 
that the courts of the State of Utah would not have jurisdiction 
over Hawkeye because Hawkeye would have fulfilled every one of 
the criteria set forth in Hill v. Zale Corporation (1971) 25 U.2d 
357, 482 P.2d 332, where the court, at page 334, said as follows: 
"1. Whether there are local offices, stores 
or outlets; 
2. The presence of personnel, how hired, fired 
and paid; the degree of control and the nature of their 
duties; 
3. The manner of holding out to the public by 
way of advertising, telephone listings, catalogs, etc.; 
4. The presence of its property, real or 
personal, or interest therein, including inventories, 
bank accounts, etc.; 
5. Whether the activities are sporadic or 
transitory as compared to continuous and systematic; 
6. The extent to which the alleged facts of 
the asserted claim arose from activities within the 
state; 
7. The relative hardship or convenience to the 
parties in being 'required to litigate the controversy 
in the state or elsewhere." 
What we have in this case is a situation where the 
principal stockholder in a business which is clearly operating 
within the State of Utah and is doing business with persons and 
other businesses within the State of Utah, comes in the State 
-7-
during this period of time on at least four occasions to see how 
his business is proceeding, he calls his agent, Milt Gordon, 
within the State of Utah once a week for two years to see how 
his business is progressing, and induces Respondent to do 
business with his business by giving his personal guaranty. 
Clearly, all statutory, constitutional and case law 
requirements have been met with regards to the actions of the 
Appellant within the State of Utah- See: 78-27-24 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (as amended, L. 1969, Ch 246 §3); International 
Shoe Co, v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 L.ed 95; 
and Foreign Study League v. Holland American Line, 27 U.2d 442, 
497 P.2d 244 (1972). 
The only way Appellant can prevail on his claim of lack 
of jurisdiction is if this Court is prepared to say that the 
$20,000.00 guaranty must have been executed by the Appellant 
solely within the boundaries of the State of Utah. 
In accepting Appellant's position, this Court would have 
to conclude that a person could come within the State of Utah 
and arrange numerous business transactions, all of which affect 
the people and businesses of Utah; he could have his business 
Doerate solely within the State of Utah, using his name as a 
business name; and that so long as the document which gave him 
ownersnip of the business was signed by him outside the State of 
Utah it would matter not that this business was daily making 
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purchases from other businesses within the State of Utah and 
not paying for them. 
This, we submit, is clearly not what the Legislature 
intended when they enacted the jurisdiction over "Non-Residence 
Act" inasmuch as they specifically stated: 
". . .that the public interest demands the state 
provide its citizens with an effective means of 
redress against nonresident persons, who through 
certain significant minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to 
the state's protection. . ." (78-27-22 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, L. 1969, Ch 246 §1) 
It is further submitted by Respondent that it is not 
necessary under our Long-Arm Statutes for the Appellant to have 
personally been within the State of Utah each and every time 
any business was transacted. The testimony is clear from Mr. 
Morris's own statements (R. 168, 1. 30-30) that Mr. Morris was 
doing business in the State of Utah through his agent, Milt 
Gordon. 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-27-23 (2) reads as follows: 
"(2) The words 'transaction of business 
within this state' mean activities of a non-
resident person, his agents, or representatives 
in this state which affect persons or 
businesses within the state of Utah." (Emphasis 
added) 
This, we submit, is sufficient to sustain the findings of both 
Judge Hall and Judge Hanson, Sr. that Appellant was doing 
business within the state of Utah. 
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In his brief Appellant relies upon the following cases, 
which for the reasons hereinafter set forth are not applicable 
nor controlling in this matter: 
(1) Mack Financial Corp. v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. 
529 P.2d 429. There is no claim made by respondent in this 
matter that the highway within the state of Utah were used by 
the appellant in order to obtain long-arm jurisdiction. The 
business transacted in that case was solely done in the state of 
Colorado, and the only contact with the state of Utah was when 
an officer from Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. came to the state of 
Utah to request consent to assign the contracts to a business 
entity in Idaho. In the instant case we had Mr. Morris in the 
state of Utah at least twice a year in 1971 and 1972, plus he 
had his agent, Milt Gordon, within the state at most times and 
made calls to him at least once a week. In addition there were 
several times that Mr. Gordon was in the state of Utah and met 
and talked with employees and agents of Respondent. 
(2) Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan,526 P.2d 1186. 
This case clearly is not applicable in that the only business 
transacted in the state of Utah by defendant was the purchase of 
one policy of insurance, and this policy of insurance was initiated 
through an agent in the state of Idaho. For the reasons set forth 
in No. (1) above, this case is not applicable. 
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(3) Kocha v. Gibson Products Co. 535 P.2d 680. In this 
case there were uncontroverted facts that the Universal Carrier 
Co. did business principally in the state of Texas, had not been 
authorized to do business in the state of Utah, and did not sell 
any of its products to any business in the state of Utah. The 
court found that there were absolutely no facts upon which 
jurisdiction could be maintained. For the reasons set forth in 
No. (1) above, this case is inapplicable. 
(4) Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc. 
494 P.2d 532, 27 U.2d 233. This case was a tort case where the 
conversion took place in the state of Oregon, and the only 
contact within the state of Utah was the allegation of damages 
to plaintiff within the state of Utah and the fact that the 
purchase price was payable at Salt Lake City, Utah. This case 
clearly is not applicable in that it does not address itself to 
the question of the numerous contacts in the state of Utah which 
the record in this case showed. 
(5) Conn v. Whitmore, 9 U.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871. This 
case is not applicable because we do not have the question of an 
out-of-state buyer taking the initiative. We have in this case 
an in-state supplier taking the initiative and the damage was 
done to a citizen within the state of Utah, to wit: Respondent, 
who is qualified to do business in the state of Utah and does in 
fact transaction business in the state of Utah and is entitled 
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to the protection of the Utah Courts. 
In addition to the cases cited by Appellant in his brief 
on this point, there are some recent Utah Supreme Court decisions 
which should be distinguished at this point. The first one 
being the case of Cate Rental Co., Inc. v. Whalen & Co. 549 P.2d 
707 (Utah, 1976) in which case the Court found that the defendant's 
president had been in Salt Lake City to discuss business dealings 
on only one occasion and that there had been perhaps five phone 
calls each year during which the parties had transacted business. 
In the instant case there were at least two times in each of the 
years the business was transacted between the parties that 
Appellant was within the state of Utah, he was constantly present 
in the state of Utah through his agent, Milt Gordon, and in 
addition made phone calls once a week for approximately two years. 
Secondly, Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp. 548 P.2d 1257 
(Utah, 1976) wherein there were two times that the general manager 
of Union Plastics Corp. came within the state of Utah and had 
meetings. The rest of the negotiations with the parties and the 
consummation of the contract took place outside the state of 
Jtah. This case is distinguishable because of the numerous 
teieonone calls by appellant to check on his business within 
:ne state of Utah and his constant presence within the state of 
rJtah bv and through is agent, Milt Gordon. (78-27-23(2), Utah 
:ode Annotated, 1953, as amended, L. 1969, Ch. 246, § 2). 
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It is respectfully submitted by Respondent that the 
presence of Appellant within the state of Utah during the time in 
question has been clearly demonstrated by the record. That the 
activities which gave rise to the claim against Appellant were 
continuous and systematic, and that they were activities which 
occurred within the state of Utah, to wit: the transaction of the 
cookie business, and thus it is more fair and logical that 
jurisdiction be found in this state. 
It is further submitted by the Respondent that the 
Appellant has not shown in his brief the incorrectness of the 
rulings of the Third Judicial District Court.In the case of 
Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp. supra, at page 1259, this 
court said as follows: 
''. . .Second, on appeal we indulge the presumption 
of verity and correctness of the trial court's 
determination and do not distrub it unless the 
plaintiff has shown that it was in error." 
It is thus incumbent upon the Appellant to not engage in general-
ities but to show specifically wherein the lower court erred. 
POINT II 
THE GUARANTY WAS COMPLETE AND WAS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
It is a fortiori that whenever there is a vague, ambiguous 
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or unclear document, such document should be construed against 
the party who was responsible for the drafting of this document. 
General Appliance Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 U.2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 
(1973) . 
However, a reading of the guaranty, which is the subject 
matter of this suit (R-3) clearly shows that this document is not 
ambiguous on its face. It would make no difference in this 
matter whether Mr. Birkinshaw had or had not signed the document. 
The document in its opening paragraphs reads, in part, as 
follows: 
". . .and in consideration thereof, and of the 
benefits to accrue to each of us therefrom, each 
of us is a primary obligor severally and jointly 
and unconditionally guarantees to you. . ." 
(Emphasis added) 
It is respectfully submitted that the document in 
question is not vague, ambiguous or uncertain by its terms. 
Respondent has no argument with Appellant's statement 
that it is well settled law that a guaranty containing the 
conditional signature of one proposed guarantor subject to the 
additional signature of another party is not valid without the 
subsequent signature of the other parties. State Bank v. 
Burton Gardner, 14 U. 420, 48 P. 402 (1897) 
The important matter which appellant has overlooked is 
that where conditions are made as between persons that one will 
not be bound unless the other has likewise signed the guaranty, 
this condition must be communicated to all of the parties involved. 
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In this particular case Mr. Morris, the Appellant, testified that 
he at no time communicated this condition to anyone at Packaging 
Corporation of America. His testimony is as follows: 
"Q Now, you have made some allegations to the effect 
that this guaranty is conditioned upon Mr. Birkinshaw 
signing it, as being jointly liable with you, is that 
correct? 
A That same condition is attached to the first 
$10,000.00 one. 
Q Now, did you ever communicate that condition to 
anyone who is an officer, agent, or employee of the 
Packaging Corporation of America? 
A Not to my knowledge. 
Q To whom did you communicate that condition? 
A To Mr. Birkinshaw and to Mr. Gordon." (R-169, 1. 17-27) 
It is well settled in the law that if you seek to have 
conditions placed upon your guaranty you must communicate these 
conditions to the creditor. Farmers & Stockgrowers' Bank v. 
Pahvant Valley Land Co., 50 U. 35, 165 P. 462 (1917);First 
National Bank in Grand Junction v. Osborne, 28 U.2d 387, 503 P.2d 
440 (1972); Financial Corporation of America v. Prudential Carbon 
& Ribbon Co. , 29 U.2d 23*8, 507 P.2d 1026 (1973); and State Bank 
of Utah v. Burton Gardner, supra, where at page 403 of 48 P. the 
Court approved the following part of the instruction: 
". . .unless you find that the plaintiff had actual 
notice that the defendants who signed the guaranty 
signed it with the condition precedent to their 
liability thereon that all the directors should 
endorse on a note and sign the contract of guaranty; 
and also in the event of any director not signing 
that none of those who signed would be liable." 
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Th is position has been approved by this Court as aforesaid and 
by many of our sister states. J. L. Watkins Co. v. Brund, 294 
P.2d 1024 (1931, Wash); Spencer Oil Co. v. Welborn, 20 N.C.App. 
681, 212 S.E.2d 618 (1974); Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Foster, 
(Minn, 1936) 264 N.W. 570; Livestock Nat. Bank of South Omaha 
v. Marshall, (Neb, 1936) 267 N.W. 414; and McClmtock v. Ayers, 
(Wyo, 1927) 253 P. 658 
Respondent at no time relied on the signing of Mr. 
Birkinshaw. They were interested only in having Mr. Morris 
sign the guaranty before advancing additional credit (R-91). 
POINT III 
THE SUBJECT GUARANTY WAS SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION. 
It appears from the evidence adduced at the time of 
trial that during the latter part of 1971 and the early part of 
197 2, Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's Royal Dutch Cookies 
had placed orders with Respondent that would have increased their 
indebtedness beyond the original guaranty signed by Appellant in 
the sum of $10,000.00, and in fact this indebtedness did exceed 
the $10,000.00 by virtue of several insufficient funds checks 
that were returned by the bank and which amounts were charged 
back to the account of Hawkeye Investment (Exhibits 7P, 8P and 
9P; R-lll, 1. 9-21) 
It was during this period of time that contract was 
made with the Appellant to increase his personal guaranty to 
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the $20,000.00 figure (R-95, 1. 21-26). It took a period of 
approximately sixty days before Mr. Morris, the Appellant, had 
agreed to execute the new guaranty, and the guaranty was not 
delivered to the Respondent until February of 197 2. According 
to the testimony and Exhibits 2P and 3P, orders had been 
placed during this period of time but had not been manufactured 
and shipped to Hawkeye Investment, which orders when manufactured 
and shipped were billed according to their order date, and thus 
it would appear that perhaps the amount owed to Respondent 
exceeded the $10,000.00. However, this is not the situation, 
because of the return checks and because of the orders that had 
not been processed and billed until a later date. The testimony 
of Mr. Remley and Mr. Ellison clearly show that upon the receipt 
of the orders from Hawkeye Investment, that appeared to exceed 
the $10,000.00 guaranty limit, they immediately started negotia-
tions with Appellant in an attempt to get the $20,000.00 guaranty 
executed (R-146 and 147). 
The case of Armstrong v. Cache Valley Land & Canal Co. 
14 U. 450, 48 P. 690 (1897) appears to stand for the proposition 
that if the defendants receive no benefit from the guaranty then 
there was no consideration. However, in the instant case the 
Appellant was a large stockholder in Hawkeye Investment Company, 
he was concerned with the cookie plant operating and having the 
necessary packaging to market its products, and in order to 
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accomplish this it was necessary for Hawkeye Investment to 
acquire the packaging from the Respondent. This was understood 
and accepted by the Appellant before he executed the guaranty 
for $20,000.00. In his testimony (R-163, 1. 18024) he said as 
follows: 
.". . .1 am not sure whether it was a phone 
conversation, or several conversations, but it 
was on the basis that the $10,000.00 line of 
credit that Mr. Birkinshaw and I had previously 
guaranteed had been stood up, and in order to 
get anything over $10,000.00 we were going to 
have to execute another guaranty in the amount 
of $20,000.00." 
The guaranty itself (R-3) recites consideration being received 
by the Appellant, and further states: 
". . .and of benefits to accrue to each of us 
therefrom, . . . " 
The guaranty on its face is a valid guaranty, it is an absolute 
guaranty and is fully enforceable against the Appellant. Brown 
v. Merit, 97 U. 65, 89 P.2d 478 (1939); and Hallstrom v. Buhlar, 
14 U.2d 111, 378 P.2d 355 (1963). 
Appellant would have this Court now believe that he 
received no benefit from the execution of the $20,000.00 guaranty. 
There is no testimony that he received no benefit, and in fact 
his own testimony as set forth hereinabove would lead this writer 
to conclude that he got exactly the benefit that he expected, to 
wit: that Packaging Corporation would only allow Hawkeye 
Investment's indebtedness to exceed $10,000.00 if he executed 
the $20,000.00 guaranty, which he did. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court 
properly concluded that the Appellant had submitted himself to 
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts by engaging in business 
within the State of Utah and by maintaing an agent in this State 
with whom he had weekly contact during the time period involving 
the transactions between Appellant and Respondent. 
The Trial Court further correctly found valid 
consideration for the guaranty, and that the guaranty was clear 
and unambiguous and the alleged condition precedent attached 
to the guaranty by the Appellant was not properly communicated 
to the Respondent, and the Appellant is therefore bound by his 
guaranty and Respondent respectfully submits that this Court 
should affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
